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Questioning the univocity ideal. 
The difference between socio-cognitive Terminology
and traditional Terminology
Abstract
In this article we are questioning the univocity ideal of traditional Terminology. We
show how traditional Terminology in line with Saussurian structuralism ignores part of
the interplay between the elements of the semantic triangle. Cognitive semantics and
functional linguistics have offered an alternative for the Saussurian structuralist
approach. Several of their findings can be of use for the development of socio-cognitive
Terminology.
In the LSP of the life sciences, the structure of concepts reflects their episte-
mological function. This could have consequences for the principles and methods of
terminological description. While some concepts (like intron ) are clear-cut and can
therefore be submitted to the principle of univocity, others (like blotting and biotech-
nology) have prototype structure. For prototypically structured categories univocity
can not be the aim as polysemy, synonymy and figurative language are part of their
naming history.
The semantic triangle which was introduced by Gomperz (1908)
(Felber, 1984:100) has been referred to by Wüster in 19561 (Drei-
teiliges Wortmodell (Wüster, 1991:165; in English translation: Felber,
1984:100)), the founder of the Vienna school of Terminology. What is
basically explored in this triangular model is the relationship between
some kind of reality (the world), a means to communicate about and to
create this reality (language), and the centre of reasoning about and of
understanding both the world and language (the human mind). (figure
1)
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1 Other authors who made reference to the semantic triangle are Ogden (1923),
Ullmann (1952), Knobloch (1956), Baldinger (1959)).
Figure 1: The semantic triangle
Wüster’s interpretation of the elements at the three vertices are: “Ge-
genstand (Sachverhalt)”, “Lautkörper” and “Wortinhalt” translated by
Felber into individual object, symbol and concept. (figure 2)
Figure 2: Wüster’s Dreiteiliges Wortmodell
In what follows we shall try and compare the filling in of these three
elements in traditional Terminology and in a new theory of Terminol-
ogy2 we should like to propose here which opts for a different theo-
retical framework being strongly inspired by the insights of cognitive
semantics and functional linguistics.
This new socio-cognitive theory of Terminology reacts against the
theoretical framework which underpins the procedures and methods of
Terminology as traditionally defined, perceived and established by
Wüster and his successors by means of a set of guiding principles as
from 1959 (Laurén & Picht, 1993). The same theoretical framework
was largely shared by the allegedly different schools of Terminology




2 We distinguish between Terminology and terminology. Terminology (capitalised)
refers to the theory underlying and resulting from the study of terminology, the vo-
cabulary of LSP (Language for Specific Purposes).
symbol/ Lautkörper individual object/ Gegenstand
concept/ Wortinhalt
understandable as on the one hand all the Terminology schools under-
went the influence of the leading trend in linguistics at the time of their
heydays: Saussurian structuralism; and on the other hand the under-
lying motivation for each of the Terminology schools seems to be lan-
guage planning. In more detail this involves that: one, Saussurian struc-
turalist semantics believed that (words have) meanings (that) can be
clearly delineated. The European (as opposed to the Canadian) termi-
nology model starts from the belief that a concept, that will be given the
status of the ‘meaning’ of the term that will be assigned to it, can and
should be clearly delineated.
Two, Saussurian structuralist semantics believes that the best way to
describe meaning is to describe the mutual delimitation of concepts
(semantic relations). Traditional Terminology believes that the best way
to describe concepts is to determine their position in a concept system
which visualises logical and ontological relationships. On the basis of
the position in the concept system a definition will be formulated.
Three, Saussurian structuralist semantics believes that the best way
to describe meaning is to concentrate on denotational meaning (as op-
posed to connotational meaning) and on the literal meaning (and not the
figurative meaning) of words. Traditional Terminology believes that the
concept system is to be seen as independent from the term system, and
that consequently, unlike words, terms are context independent: the
meaning of the term is the concept.
Four, Saussurian structuralist semantics believes that meaning is to
be described synchronically. For traditional Terminology language de-
velopment and language evolution need not be studied as the main em-
phasis is on the concept system. Therefore terminology is synchronic.
Five, it is significant that the underlying motivation for each of the
Terminology schools seems to be language planning. For the Prague,
the Soviet and the Vienna schools there is a strong orientation towards
standardisation. The Vienna school has the conviction that it is possible
to influence the naming activities in LSP, and the Canadian centre has
the specific aim to secure the survival of the French language in
Canada. One can imagine how difficult it is to question the principles
and methods of terminological meaning description if the underlying
motivation for the claimed scientific schools is language planning,
which implies sponsoring by governmental bodies with language polit-
ical objectives. The outcome is that the scientific study of Terminology
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is confounded with establishing principles and methods for the prag-
matic activity of standardisation.
The new socio-cognitive theory of Terminology emphasises that Ter-
minology should not be uniquely oriented towards standardisation and
it questions the validity of objectivism as the theoretical underpinning
of terminology.
1. The objectivist model of traditional Terminology
In traditional Terminology the full potential of the three elements of the
semantic triangle was deliberately not explored nor exploited.
The world was reduced to what could be objectified, language was
only considered in its naming capacity, and the human mind was only
given credit for its capacity to classify individual objects on the basis of
recognising characteristics which were common to all the members of
the class representing a concept.
The relationship between the world and language was limited to the
acceptance that the world is objectively given and has to be named.
The relationship between the world and the mind was reduced to the
fact that the world can be understood by the human mind thanks to the
classificatory capacity of the mind.
For as far as the relationship between language and the mind is con-
cerned, the fact that language may have a role to play in the mental
activity of understanding the world, in other words the creative poten-
tial of language is not ignored, but disregarded, brushed aside as irrel-
evant.
Underlying all this is logical positivism’s belief that for clear think-
ing natural language is an obstacle. A calculus, i.e. a formal axiomatic
system, would be ideal. In formalising an existing axiomatic system
variables are replaced by meaningless symbols. In doing so one obtains
a logical system without meaning which allows for the objectification
of several purely formal deductions. A calculus allows for a sum up of
existing theoretical systems in short symbolic representations which
permits more insight in the purely logical relations between diverse
statements. Natural language is treated as a necessary evil which one
tries to constrict. One example of such attempts at constriction is stan-
dardisation of terminology. Standardisation equals a strife for uni-
vocity. One concept is referred to by one term (no synomymy) and one
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term can only refer to one concept (no polysemy). Polysemy, which is a
characteristic of natural language is treated as uneconomical and there-
fore steps need to be taken to curtail the phenomenon. Language is
reduced to the conscious literal level. Figurative language and conno-
tative language are disregarded. Language is not to be seen as a process
in time. What is aimed at is a synchronic language description.
2. The integrated model of modern Terminology
Modern socio-cognitive Terminology can benefit from the findings of
cognitive semantics which elaborates on the full potential of the inter-
action between the world, language, and the human mind; and from the
insight that the elements of the semantic triangle function in a social
setting.
Cognitive Terminology considers the world of science and technol-
ogy as experiential. Much of what we know and understand about the
world is embodied, is the result of our sensory perceptions. It should be
added that the other part is the result of our reasoning, which is inter-
active with the input via sensory perception, and via the transfer of
other language users’ ideas which we take in via discourse (written and
spoken) for which language is the medium.
Language has a cognitive function (ideational), next to a textual and
a communicative (interpersonal) function. (Halliday, 1985). Language
is a means for categorisation.3
Modern Terminology could incorporate the idea that humans do not
just perceive the objective world but have the faculty to create cate-
gories in the mind. Many of these categories in the mind have proto-
type structure.
Prototype-theory finds its origin in the work of psychologist Rosch.
Her hypothesis is that the human being has a prototype, a best example
for each category, in his mind and that classification happens on that
basis. In Women, Fire and Dangerous Things, Lakoff (1987) proves that
the categorisation of things does not happen exclusively on the basis of
common features. His hypothesis is that human observation is deter-
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3 Note the distinction between on the one hand logical and ontological classification,
which in traditional Terminology is supposed to be possible in the mind without con-
sidering or using language and before the naming of the concepts takes place, and on
the other hand categorisation which is a result of the interaction between language and
the mind.
mined by the possibilities and restrictions of the human body and is
culturally determined. Rosch studied prototypes via configurations of
features, which helped her to understand the structure of the categories
in the mind. Exemplars of the category ‘bird’ can have features like ‘is
able to fly’, ‘has feathers’, ‘has a beak’, ‘is not a pet’, ‘lays eggs’ etc.
There is no need for one or more features which are shared by all the
exemplars of a category. Exemplars belong to a category because they
show resemblance and share different sets of features. The exemplars
can be seen as members of one family. The exemplars of the category
have family-resemblance.
As far as the relationship between the world and language is con-
cerned, language is the medium for expressing human world perception
and human world conception. Language plays a role in the human
understanding of the world.
Looking at the relationship between the world and the mind socio-
cognitive Terminology considers the world to be (partly) in the human
mind. When considering language and mind, socio-cognitive Termi-
nology is ready to accept that the understanding of language cannot be
separated from the understanding of the world.
Figure 3: The interpretation of the relationships between the world, language and the
mind in traditional Terminology and in socio-cognitive Terminology.
In conclusion we can say that for socio-cognitive Terminology the
explanatory power of the full potential of how all three elements of the
semantic triangle interact is of importance in studying terminology.
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traditional Terminology socio-cognitive Terminology
the world and language the world exists objectively and can be named
language plays in the
understanding of the world
the world and the mind
the world can be understood
by the human mind thanks
to the classificatory capacity
of the mind
the world is (partly) in the 
human mind
language and the mind the creative potential of lan-
guage is disregarded
the understanding of lan-
guage can not be separated
from the understanding of
the world
3. Distinction between types of concepts based on diffe-
rences in interaction between the three elements in the seman-
tic triangle
Geeraerts (1993:58-63) explains how cognitive semantics links up the
empiricist position that “experience determines conceptuality” (58)
and the rationalist idea that “conceptual knowledge determines expe-
rience” (58).
“On the one hand experientialism demonstrates how experiential factors
shape the structure of cognition; on the other hand, paradigmatism points
out how existing conceptualizations may influence the interpretation of
new experiences.” (58)
In this analysis, existing concepts have an influence on how we shape
new experience. Next experiences are interpreted in terms of and inte-
grated with existing concepts; Geeraerts has proved that the structure of
our concepts reflects their epistemological function. He distinguishes
between two types of prototypically structured categories: cognitive
categories and ontological categories (Geeraerts, 1989a:74-79)(see also
Zawada & Swanepoel, 258-61)
As an example of a cognitive category he gives Dutch “vers” (=
fresh, recent), Dutch “vogel” (bird) is an ontological category. In the
following scheme (figure 4)(Geeraerts, 1989a:78) he compares the two
types of categories on four parameters: psychological status, typical
relationships, explanatory factors for the prototype structure and the
principle of cohesion.
Figure 4: Geeraert’s comparison between ontological and cognitive categories on four
parameters.
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ontological categories cognitive categories
example “vogel” “vers”
psychological status not ambiguous ambiguous
typical relationships non-figurative resemblance all associative relations
explanatory factor for 
the prototype structure materialistic factors functional factors
principle of cohesion presumed identity interpretative association 
In what follows we want to show first that in the LSP of the life sci-
ences, the structure of concepts reflects their epistemological function
and that this could have consequences for the principles and methods of
terminological description. We shall give examples of terminological
units which are more fit for a description in line with the TC37 4 termi-
nology concept approach for terminology while for others it is better
to consider them in line with the experiential category approach. In
the second place we want to show that for prototypically structured
categories the claimed functional advantage of univocity is an delusion. 
Geeraerts comparison between two types of prototypically struc-
tured categories (cognitive categories and ontological categories) in
LGP may be of theoretical relevance in studying the vocabulary of LSP
as well (and this contrary to the convictions of traditional Terminol-
ogy). In studying the epistemological function of categories in the
domain of the life sciences, we found out that it makes sense to first of
all distinguish between concepts/categories which do not have proto-
type structure and concepts/categories which do.
Figure 5: The naming history of a prototypically structured concept/category differs
from the naming history of a non-prototypically structured concept/ category.
Elsewhere we showed (Temmerman,1996c) how an in-depth con-
trastive study of the intension and the extension of three concept/
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4 Technical Committee 37 of the International Standardisation Organization is res-





the naming history of the concept
shows a natural tendency towards
univocity
polysemy is functional/
the naming history of the concept/cate-
gory shows how language is a medium
for making progress in the understand-





categories5 occurring in the LSP of the life sciences shows different
requirements and possibilities for definitions. A concept/category like
intron can be defined in accordance with the traditional terminological
principles and methods as it is a logical concept/category. For the con-
cepts/categories of the type techniques (for which we give the example
of blotting) this is less possible and for an umbrella concept/ category
like biotechnology not at all. An umbrella concept/category like bio-
technology meets all the requirements for intensional and extensional
prototypicality as described in cognitive semantics. (Geeraerts, 1989;
Taylor,1989; Kleiber, 1990) With reference to Geeraerts classification
(figure 4) blotting has most of the characteristics of an ontological
category of the “vogel” type, while “biotechnology” bears more resem-
blance to a cognitive category of the “vers” type. For details we refer to
Temmerman (1996c).
For our present purpose it will suffice to briefly introduce these three
concepts/categories and to show figures 7 and 8 from which it will be
clear that a comparison of the intension and the extension of the three
concepts/categories in the traditional model and in the alternative
prototype model shows that concept/categories which show prototype
structure cannot be adequately defined and described on the basis of the
principles and methods of the Vienna school for terminology. 
We shall first provisionally introduce the three concepts by quoting a
definition from a specialist source.
• The first concept/category is intron
Gilbert discovered in 1978 that genes are split, i.e. that they have a
structure in which the coding sequences and the non coding sequences
interlace
“By the late 1970s, it was clear that the protein-coding sequences in a
eukaryotic gene do not necessarily consist of a single continuous stretch of
DNA, as they do in a bacterial gene. Instead the coding region is often
discontinuous, being interrupted by stretches of noncoding DNA; such
noncoding DNA segments are called intervening sequences or introns,
and the coding segments of genes - those that generally direct polypeptide
synthesis - are referred to as exons” (Berg & Singer,1992:126)
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5 As concept is used in traditional Terminology and category in cognitive semantics
and as we are comparing the possibilities and limitations of both approaches we prefer
not to choose for either one or the other denomination but to refer to the problem as
concept/category.
Figure 6: The structure of eukaryotic DNA.
• The second concept/category is blotting
For geneticists it is often useful to be able to identify a particular se-
quence in DNA fragments separated by gel electrophoresis. In 1975 E.
M. Southern developed a method for doing so. Later, blotting of RNA
and protein was carried out and named by (false) analogy Northern
blotting and Western blotting. Methods for identifying both DNA and
protein are called South-Western blotting, for both RNA and protein
North-Western blotting.
The Dictionary of Microbiology and Molecular Biology (1987) has
the following entry for blotting:
“Following ELECTROPHORESIS: the transfer of nucleic acids and/or
proteins from a gel strip to a specialized, chemically reactive paper (or
other matrix) on which the nucleic acids etc. may become covalently bound
in a pattern similar to that present in the original gel. Transfer may be ef-
fected by capillary action - in which case paper (e.g. nitrocellulose, DEAE
paper, APT paper) is sandwiched between the gel and a highly absorptive
pad;
alternatively, in electro-blotting, transfer is effected by electrophoresis. In
the earliest (capillary) blotting, DNA was transferred to nitrocellulose ( in
the so-called ‘Southern blot’ or SOUTHERN HYBRIDIZATION proce-
dure; subsequently, blotting of RNA (Northern blot) and protein (Western
blot) was carried out. After blotting, a particular target molecule may be
identified or assayed e.g. by fluorescence labelling or enzyme immuno-
assay techniques.”
• The third concept is biotechnology
Biotechnology is “the application of advanced biological techniques in
the manufacture of industrial products, including the production of
antibiotics, insulin and interferon, or for environmental management,
such as waste recycling” (Academic Press Dictionary of Science and
Technology,1992)
“Biotechnology took on a new meaning and focus with this novel power to
use DNA as a tool to make marketable materials. Modern biotechnology
can be defined in its most general sense as the scientific manipulation of
organisms, particularly at the molecular genetic level, to produce useful
products. In a sense, biotechnology is one of the oldest industries in the
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exon intron exon intron exon intron
world. The fermentation of wine or the preparation of bread, both brought
about through the metabolic activities of yeast, come under its rubric, as
do the centuries of cross-breeding and hybridization of crops and domesti-
cated animals.” (Lee, 1993:16-17)
Figure 7: The feasibility of a definition in line with the principles and methods of tradi-
tional terminology for three concepts.
Figure 8: Four characteristics of prototype structure in three types of categories
Intron can be defined in a logical concept structure, but blotting and
biotechnology cannot.
Based on our insights gained in studying three types of concepts in
the vocabulary of the life sciences we believe we can formulate the fol-
lowing propositions:
One, when new phenomena are discovered which can be clearly de-
lineated and defined there is a natural development towards univocity
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which in that case appears to be in favour of unambiguous and therefore
efficient communication (3.1).
Two, univocity as the ideal for unambiguous and therefore efficient
reasoning and communication can not be defended for the proto-
typically structured categories (3.2). This has at least three aspects to it.
First polysemy is functional in LSP. It is the consequence of meaning
evolution. The constant discussion over how to name and what words
mean is in the discourse of a community and implies language evo-
lution. Polysemy is the result. What is univocal at one time may grow
into polysemy depending on the type of concept/category and how it is
understood (3.2.1). Second (near-) synonymy exists for very good rea-
sons (3.2.2). Third, figurative language is a motor which causes the
thoughts and consequently the understanding of the world to move
(3.2.3).
3.1. When new phenomena are discovered which can be
clearly delineated and traditionally defined6 there is a natural
development towards univocity which in that case favours un-
ambiguous and therefore efficient communication 
An indication that for clear-cut concepts/categories like intron, which
do not show characteristics of prototypicality, univocity is indicated is
in the natural tendency towards standardisation as it can be observed in
the discourse of the scientists at the time of the discoveries. Once the
definition is agreed upon, the naming is negotiated and there is a ten-
dency to try and rule out synonymy. The order of things is in accord-
ance with the principles and methods for standardisation.
We can prove this with the example of the birth of the concept/ cate-
gories intron-exon. The case of intron-exon is a case of naming negotia-
tion.
We went to the articles which were published in the leading period-
icals Nature and Science in 1978 and 1979 when the phenomenon of the
intron-exon structure of eukaryotic genes was being discovered. We
consider these articles in chronological order:
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6 By traditional definition we mean the type of definition based on logical or ontol-
ogical (partitive) classification, giving the superordinate term and enumerating the
necessary and sufficient characteristics which delineate the concept under conside-
ration from other related concepts on the same horizontal level.
Three authors were publishing on the intron-exon structure of
eukaryotic genes:
1. Walter Gilbert, who was then American Cancer Society Professor of
Molecular Biology at Harvard University, published a short article
entitled: “Why genes in pieces?” Nature, 9 Feb. 1978:501.
2. W. Ford Doolittle, was Associate Professor in the Department of
Biochemistry, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, when he
published the article “Genes in pieces: were they ever together?”
Nature, 13 April 1978:581-82. 
3. Francis Crick wrote the article ‘Split Genes and RNA Splicing.’
Science, 20 April 1979, 264-71, when he was Kieckhefer Research
Professor in La Jolla, California. 
In their articles they discuss the terminology. First we should make it
clear that the facts are agreed upon: there is a consensus that eukaryotic
genes have alternating stretches of coding and non-coding DNA. Sec-
ond, we find evidence in the scientific literature that suggestions are
given by the authors for the naming of three concepts/categories (split
genes, intron and exon). The core definition for each of these con-
cepts/categories is given in figure 9. We shall first pay attention to
Gilbert’s terminology.
‘Our picture of the organisation of genes in higher organisms has recently
undergone a revolution. Analyses of eukaryotic genes in many laboratories
1-10, studies of globin, ovalbumin, immunoglobulin, SV40 and polyoma,
suggest that in general the coding sequences on DNA, the regions that will
ultimately be translated into amino acid sequence, are not continuous but
are interrupted by ‘silent’ DNA. Even for genes with no protein product
such as the tRNA genes of yeast and the rRNA genes in Drosophila, and
also for viral messages from adenovirus, Rous sarcoma virus and murine
leukaemia virus, the primary RNA transcript contains internal regions
that are excised during maturation, the final tRNA or messenger being a
spliced product.
The notion of the cistron, the genetic unit of function that one thought cor-
responded to a polypeptide chain, now must be replaced by that of a trans-
cription unit containing regions which will be lost from the mature mes-
senger-which I suggest we call introns (for intragenic regions)-alterna-
ting with regions which will be expressed-exons. The gene is a mosaic:
expressed sequences held in a matrix of silent DNA, an intronic matrix.
The introns seen so far range from 100 to 10,000 bases in length; I expect 
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the amount of DNA in introns will turn out to be five to ten times the
amount in exons.” 7
In this text-fragment a conclusion is drawn based on “analyses of
eukaryotic genes in many laboratories”. The author justifies the
‘many’ by enumerating 10 references to publications on the subject at
the end of the article.
The studies suggest that the coding sequences on DNA are not con-
tinuous but are interrupted by “’silent’ DNA”. Gilbert suggests to call
the “regions which will be lost from the mature messenger” “introns
(for intragenic regions” and “the regions which will be expressed-
exons”. This is an example of an attempt at coining new terms in a
scientific article. It is perfect for illustrating the stimulus-response
principle. Gilbert is making reference to 10 other publications, which
he has taken into consideration before suggesting names for the newly
discovered phenomena (‘silent’ DNA, ‘intron’, ‘exon’, ‘introgenic’
matrix). His suggested terminology is partly followed by colleagues,
like Doolittle and Crick (see further) but what is most interesting is that
it is also commented upon and criticised as the fragment from Crick’s
article shows.(see further).
Figure 9: Synonyms in specialist publications for three clearly delineated concepts.
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DEFINITION: any eukaryotic gene in
which the coding se-
quences are interrupted
by a number of usually
noncoding regions
(Rieger)
base sequences along the
DNA of the gene which
do not appear in the final
mRNA
base sequences on the
DNA which do end up in
the mRNA
Gilbert, genes in pieces introns exons
9 Feb. 1978 internal regions regions which will be 
Nature intragenic regions expressed







Crick, split genes introns exons
20 Apr. 1979 intervening DNA sense DNA
Science internal stretch
nonsense DNA
7 The emphasis is mine.
We shall now consider Doolittle’s article. Doolittle refers to Gilbert’s
terminology:
“The recent discovery that many eukaryotic structural genes are inter-
rupted by stretches (sometimes very long) of non-informational ‘inter-
vening’ DNA 1-7 is the latest and most dramatic demonstration of the
striking difference between the organisation of prokaryotic and eukaryotic
genomes. (...)
Gilbert has proposed that intervening DNA serves to speed evolution; the
mature polypeptide chain is translated from a spliced mRNA derived from
a primary transcript of both intronic (non-informational DNA) and exo-
nic (coding) DNA. Occasional imprecise splicing can generate new prot-
eins assembled from parts of old ones without sacrificing the original
genes.
(...)
In such cells a genes-in-pieces organisation (with RNA splicing) could not
only have its current (evolutionary) role, but an additional role: to ensure
that transcripts of exons ( (sic!: this parenthesis is never closed) reiterated
but often incorrectly replicated and transcribed were at least occasionally
assembled so as to template functional proteins. As replication, transcrip-
tion and translation became more faithful, such insurance became less
necessary and the replication and transcription of redundant and non-
informational DNA became increasingly irrelevant and burdensome.” 8
In line with Gilbert, to whose point of view Doolittle reacts in this arti-
cle, Doolittle uses “genes-in-pieces” here, for what in the literature
later on is mostly called “split genes”. He also uses “exons” and the ad-
jectival derivations from intron and exon: “intronic DNA” and “exonic
DNA”. For “intronic DNA” he uses the synonymous, motivated or self-
explanatory terms “redundant and non-informational DNA” and “in-
tervening DNA”.
In Crick’s article the most striking new term is “’split’ genes” (264).
“In the last 2 years there has been a mini-revolution in molecular genetics.
When I came to California, in September 1976, I had no idea that a typical
gene might be split into several pieces and I doubt if anybody else had.“
Crick refers to Gilbert ‘s article, and then, he comments on the ter-
minology:
“…in this case there are two fairly long stretches of base sequences along
the DNA of the gene which do not appear in the final mRNA. Such sequen-
ces are now known as intervening sequences; An alternative terminology,
used by Gilbert and his colleagues refers to the intervening sequences as
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8 The emphasis is mine.
“introns”; those base sequences on the DNA which do end up in the
mRNA are referred to as “exons” since they are the ones which are ex-
pressed. At this stage , any terminology is likely to lead, before long, to
difficulties and complications.(5) In this article I use the intron-exon ter-
minology, if only for want of a better one.” 9
In his footnote (5) Crick explains why he finds this terminology confus-
ing:
“There are two main difficulties. A stretch of nuclear RNA may be part of
an intron if spliced one way but part of an exon if spliced in another way.
In addiction, one is tempted to use the two words to describe the parts of
the DNA from which the stretches of RNA are transcribed. Nevertheless,
used judiciously, the two words are undoubtedly useful. I imagine some
committee will eventually decide on a wholly logical terminology.”
Apart from introducing a more general term “split genes” for “genes
having an intron-exon structure” or “genes in pieces “(Gilbert), Crick
also offers alternative terminology: he talks about “intervening se-
quences” (like Doolittle) whereas Gilbert calls these “intragenic
regions” and uses the opposition “”nonsense” stretches of DNA”
“interspersed within the “sense” DNA”. Furtherdown Crick intro-
duces another synonym for “intron”: “internal stretch” and he links up
the concepts of “split genes” and “splicing”:
‘Thus splicing is defined as the mechanism by which a single functional
RNA molecule is produced by the removal of one or more internal stre-
tches of RNA during the processing of the primary transcript.
Where are split genes found?’. (265)
What Crick presents as if it were a problem of lexicalisation (termi-
nology) causing ambiguity which he suggests could be solved by some
terminology committee is actually not a terminology problem at all.
The fact that the same stretch can be an “intron” in one “context” and
an “exon” in another, does not make the terminology unclear as
“intron” and “exon” are motivated terms because they express that in
a specific situation particular stretches of DNA are not coding or are
coding for information.
What we see at work here, is a discussion between field specialists
about the best term for concepts/categories, the definition of which they
agree upon. The order of things is like in a standardisation procedure:
first the concept, then several possible names (synonyms) and a trend
towards univocity.
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9 The emphasis is mine.
We also find that Crick is explicitly imposing his authority, which
points at the social factors in choosing the preferred term. As the co-
discoverer (together with Watson in 1953) of the double-helix structure
of DNA he is likely to be taken seriously in academic circles.
3.2. Univocity as the ideal for unambiguous and therefore
efficient reasoning and communication can not be defended
for the prototypically structured categories
The three reasons why univocity is not feasible nor desirable for
concepts/categories with prototype structure are represented in figure
10.
Figure 10. This table shows the contrastive stances of traditional Terminology and
socio-cognitive Terminology with regard to three aspects of univocity.
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The univocity ideal in traditional
Terminology
The alternative view of socio-
cognitive Terminology
Univocity aspect 1: a term is not poly-
semous. Terminology takes a synchronic
point of view The dynamic nature of
language is disregarded.
Polysemy is functional in LSP discourse,
it is a consequence of meaning evolution .
The constant discussion over how to name
and what words mean is in the discourse
of a community and has a time aspect.
Polysemy is the result. What is univocal at
one time may grow into polysemy
depending on the type of category and
how it is understood.
Univocity aspect 2: a concept should be
referred to by one term only; a term should
not have synonym
Synonymy is functional in LSP discourse;
it reflects different perspectives
Univocity aspect 3: literal language can
replace figurative language.
Figurative language is a motor to make the
thoughts move
3.2.1. Polysemy in language is functional. It is the result of
the human reflection about the world. From a purely semasi-
ological point of view it is the result of meaning evolution.
We shall illustrate the functionality of polysemy in the progress of the
life sciences with the case of molecular cloning.10 As the case is quite
complicated we suggest to formulate the problem in the following two
questions. Question one: why are the methods developed in molecular
biology for the amplification of a fragment of DNA named cloning or
molecular cloning or DNA cloning or gene cloning? Question two: why
has cloning recently been threatened to be replaced by its hyperonym
amplification? 
The naming of the methods for the amplification of a fragment of
DNA cannot be separated from the history of the lexeme clone in
general nor from the history of the development of the life sciences
(biology, medicine, biochemistry, genetics, molecular biology, biotech-
nology). Figure 10 is a schematic representation of the meaning exten-
sion of the lexeme cloning which entered the English language in 1903,
both as a substantive clone and as its derived form cloning, indicating
the technique.
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10 “molecular cloning - the multiplication of DNA sequences usually involving the
isolation of appropriate DNA fragments and their in vitro joining (insertion into a
restriction site) to a cloning vector capable of replication when introduced into an
appropriate host. M.c. requires: (1) DNA of interest (foreign, passenger, or target
DNA); (2) a cloning vector; (3) restriction endonucleases; (4) DNA ligase; (5) a
prokariotic or eukaryotic cell to serve as the biological host.” (Rieger, 1991:333).
Figure 10: The development of cloning.
The reply to the first question why molecular cloning was named as
such has at least the following three aspects:
One, because molecular cloning related to the other types of cloning
which had existed for a long time already when molecular cloning was
developed 
Two, the relevant meaning element which molecular cloning had in
common with all the other types of cloning which existed already was
‘identical copy’. The new element which was added to the meaning of
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1929 (source: Barnhart) bacterial cells cell cultivation
1939 (Smith:1988) plant cells in order to
achieve full plants
cell cloning and regene-
ration
late 1940s (Levine and
Suzuki, 1993:183)
amphibians enucleation
1973 (Cohen et al., 1973,
source: Rieger)
DNA molecular cloning
(gene splicing + bacterial
cell cloning)
1985 (by Saikai, according
to Rieger; by Karry Mullis
according to Watson et al.,
1992:79)
DNA PCR (polymerase chain
reaction)
1988 (Hawkes,1991:15) mammals embryo splitting
mammals nuclear transplantation
11 “The cloning of a fragment of DNA allows indefinite amounts to be produced from
even a single original molecule. (A clone is defined as a large number of identical cells
or molecules, all identical with an original ancestral cell or molecule.) The property
that makes cloning of DNA possible is the ability of bacterial plasmids and phages to
continue their usual life-style after additional sequences of DNA have been
incorporated into their genomes.” (Lewin, 1983:300).
Three, molecular cloning was named as such because it is a next step
in the evolution of molecular genetics. This in contrast with PCR (poly-
merase chain reaction). (see further).
The reply to the second question why cloning threatened to be re-
placed by amplification is twofold.
One, a new method for making large numbers of exact copies is
developed, not in the molecular genetics line but in the enzymology or
biochemistry line: polymerase chain reaction (PCR). Some writers
refer to PCR as a special type of cloning whereas others would rather
see it as a method for amplification, the hyponym of both cloning and
PCR. (see further);
Two, cloning threatened to be replaced by amplification in the termi-
nology of the life sciences as a consequence of the phenomenon of ge-
neric posting. The further development of language in other domains
of life had its repercussions. On the one hand cloning was metaphor-
ically borrowed by LGP. As the lexeme is used in more and more
domains of life it may have become overloaded12. As a consequence it
is likely to become confusing (because of too vague) in its scientific
context and since synonyms and hyperonyms exist it will predictably be
replaced by one of these. This is the case for cloning in its molecular
cloning or gene cloning sense. The term we find it replaced by in the
LSP literature is mostly amplification.
The lexeme clone and cloning not only become overloaded as a
consequence of polysemy, they also start suffering from ambiguity.
Gene cloning, which literally stands for the procedure to produce a
large number of copies of a particular gene, also ends up being used for
the totality of a new discipline (which involves more and more new
techniques under development as well) and for the aspect of the gene
cloning procedure which made the procedure worthwhile (gene
splicing). So the term gene cloning is used at the same time in its literal
sense, as a pars pro toto and as a toto pro pars, which obviously
amounts to ambiguity.
We shall look at the twofold reply to question two in more detail.
First we describe the coming into existence of the new technique for
making large numbers of exact copies: polymerase chain reaction
(PCR), then we shall illustrate the generic posting phenomenon.
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12 Overloaded terms or words are used in too many different senses (Meyer,1992:31).
What is PCR? PCR (polymerase chain reaction) is a technique devel-
oped in 1985 “which enables selective amplification of DNA se-
quences” (Nicholl, 1994:100) , but which is based on different princi-
ples and a process very different from molecular cloning. 
“The polymerase chain reaction (PCR) is an in vitro method for selective-
ly amplifying, or synthesizing millions of copies of a short region of a DNA
molecule. The reaction is carried out enzymatically in a test tube…”
(Cooper, 1994:128)
The meaning components ‘cloning’ and ‘PCR’ have in common are
‘amplification’ and ‘identical copies’. As before the development of
PCR there was only one technique ( be it in many different procedures
or methods) for amplification of DNA sequences, i.e. ‘cloning’ with
vectors in host cells, the terms ‘amplification’ and ‘cloning’ were sy-
nonymous in most contexts. Because of the development of a new
means for amplification this is no longer the case, and therefore we see
a possible shift from (near-)synonymy to superordination/subordin-
ation.
The question is whether ‘cloning’ is still going to be used as a synon-
ym of ‘amplification’ after the invention of PCR. Cloning is sometimes
found as a synonym of ‘amplifying’ or ‘amplification’:,
“Applications of PCR technology are many and diverse. It can be used to
clone specific sequences, although in many cases it is in fact not necessa-
ry to do this, as enough material for subsequent manipulations may be pro-
duced by the PCR process itself. It can be used to clone genes from one
organism by using priming sequences from another, if some sequence data
are available for the gene in question.” (Nicholl,1994:102)
but it is at the same time a hyponym, as shown in :
“Amplifying DNA. Most of the techniques currently used to analyze a seg-
ment of DNA require the availability of many copies of the segment. Two
methods for ‘amplifying’ a DNA segment are now at hand: molecular clo-
ning, which was developed in the 1970s, and the polymerase chain reac-
tion (PCR), which was developed less than a decade ago.” (Cooper,
1994:58)
This is a typical example of a situation where an existing term might
extend its meaning, due to new inventions or developments. So,
‘cloning’ might extend its meaning and the new technique (PCR) might
be classified under ‘cloning’, referring to a new method (technique) for
cloning. But an alternative choice is possible, as we shall see. 
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The two possible interpretations of how PCR relates to other con-
cepts/categories in the domain which seem to be competing in the dis-
course of specialists can be visualized as in figures 12 and 13. 
Figure 12: The first of the two competing interpretations of the meaning
relationship between molecular cloning and PCR.
Figure 13: The second of the two competing interpretations of the meaning
relationship between molecular cloning and PCR.
In the second interpretation ‘cloning’ underwent meaning extension as
PCR is considered a type of cloning.  For some authors, PCR is de-
scribed as an alternative way of amplification next to cloning and the
use of reverse transcriptase. (figure 12):
example 1
“DNA Amplification. Suppose we use the same restriction enzyme to cut
plasmids and a chromosome. When the chromosomal fragments are cut
plasmids are mixed together, they base-pair at random at their sticky ends.
By using another enzyme, DNA ligase, the base pairing can be made per-
manent.
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Techniques (methods) for the  amplification of DNA fragments:




 4. YAC cloning
b. reverse transcription
c. PCR
Techniques (methods) for the amplification of DNA fragments







t s for molecular cloning
We now have a DNA library - a collection of DNA fragments produced by
restriction enzymes and incorporated into plasmids. We can insert the
DNA library into bacteria or host cells for amplification. In other words,
after repeated replications and divisions of the host cells, we end up with
cloned DNA - multiple, identical copies of DNA fragments from the origi-
nal chromosome.
DNA amplification can occur through other methods besides cloning. For
example, single-stranded mRNA can serve as a template for assembling a
DNA strand that is identical in sequence to some desired gene. The assem-
bly requires a special viral enzyme, reverse transcriptase. After the
“hybrid” DNA/RNA molecule is assembled, the RNA strand is degraded.
Other enzymes convert the remaining strand of DNA to double-stranded
form. Any DNA molecule “copied” from mRNA is known as cDNA.
Today, the polymerase chain reaction is the most commonly used method
of DNA amplification. With this method, the gene of interest is split into
two single strands, which enzymes then copy over and over to produce mil-
lions of copies of DNA containing that gene.” (Starr, 1991:165)
“A DNA clone is any DNA sequence that has been amplified in dividing
cells. DNA sequences also can be amplified in test tubes by the polymerase
chain reaction.” (Starr, 1991:169)
example 2
“Polymerase chain reaction (PCR), a technique that allows a DNA frag-
ment to be analysed without having to be cloned first.” (Hodson,1992:207)
example 3
“The polymerase chain reaction technique (PCR) was devised by Kary
Mullis in the mid-1980s and, like DNA sequencing, has revolutionarized
molecular genetics by making possible a whole new approach to the study
and analysis of genes. A major problem in analyzing genes is that they are
rare targets in a complex genome that in mammals may contain as many as
100,000 genes. Many of the techniques in molecular genetics are con-
cerned with overcoming this problem. These techniques are very time-
consuming, involving cloning and methods for detecting specific DNA
sequences. The polymerase chain reaction has changed all this by ena-
bling us to produce enormous numbers of copies of a specific DNA se-
quence without resorting to cloning.” (Watson et al., 1992:79)
example 4
“The polymerase chain reaction (PCR) is an in vitro method for se-
lectively amplifying, or synthesizing millions of copies of a short re-
gion of a DNA molecule. The reaction is carried out enzymatically in
a test tube and has been successfully applied to regions as small as
100 base pairs and as large as 6000 base pairs. In contrast, DNA clo-
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ning is a nonselective in vivo method for replicating DNA fragments
within bacterial or yeast cells. Cloned fragments range in length from
several hundred to a million base pairs.” (Cooper, 1994:128)
In the glossary at the end of Cooper’s book it is made clear that the term
cloning is only valid for “the production of many identical copies of a
DNA fragment” by means of a cloning vector and a host cell. In the
polymerase chain reaction a different process is involved:
“molecular cloning: The production of many identical copies of a DNA
fragment by inserting the fragment into a cloning vector and propagating
the resulting recombinant vector in a host cell.”(Cooper, 1994:334)
“polymerase chain reaction (PCR): An in-vitro process for producing
many millions of copies of a DNA fragment. The process involves succes-
sive repetitions of a series of reactions and, when applied to a sample con-
taining many different DNA fragments, can amplify one selected frag-
ment.” (Cooper, 1994:335)
Other authors consider PCR to be one possible cloning method (figure
13):
example 1
“Traditional cloning of small DNA fragments is being supplanted for many
purposes by PCR, which can be regarded as in vitro cloning.” (Green,
1991:876)
example 2
“PCR can also be used to clone genes, if two suitable primers can be
made, and to select the correct gene construct from a mixture of constructs
when making a synthetic gene: the use of PCR in cloning is very wide-
spread.” (Bains, 1993:242)
example 3
“Applications of PCR technology are many and diverse. It can be used to
clone specific sequences, although in many cases it is in fact not necessa-
ry to do this, as enough material for subsequent manipulations may be pro-
duced by the PCR process itself. It can be used to clone genes from one
organism by using priming sequences from another, if some sequence data
are available for the gene in question.” (Nicholl, 1994:102)
In specialised language cloning became so overloaded that it shifted
into the generic or the specific class and was replaced by amplification.
This because the emphasis was more and more on the ‘large number of
copies’-element instead of on the ‘identical copy’-element. The ‘identi-
cal copy’-core was not lost but was shifted in general language usage.
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Our data show that the semantic overloadedness seems to get solved in
the following ways: generic shifting of clone from an LSP term to a
general word and generic posting in LSP (amplification).
First aspect: cloning shifts from a term (LSP) to a word (LGP)
The metaphorical transfer of cloning
“The word ‘clone’ has entered the vernacular; it can be found in newspa-
per articles, in novels and in poems, and it is heard on radio and televisi-
on. Often it denotes a single, perfect copy of something - a person, an ani-
mal, an idea - but, this is not the way in which biologists generally use the
word.” (Berg & Singer, 1992:89) 
The figurative extension “exact duplicate, carbon copy, replica” is
first recorded about 1978.’(Barnhart, 1988:181). The lexeme ‘clone’
got a new sense or meaning extension during the eighties.
“arose during the eighties, as a number of microcomputer manufacturers
attempted to undercut the very successful IBM personal computer (and
later its successor, the PS2).” (The Oxford Dictionary of New Words,
1991:64)
“a computer which deliberately simulates the features and the facilities of
a more expensive computer; especially, a copy of the IBM PC.” (The
Oxford Dictionary of New Words, 1991:64)
The new sense of clone is described as:
“a specialization of the figurative sense of clone which originated in sci-
ence fiction: from the early seventies, , a clone was a person or animal that
had developed from a single somatic cell of its parent and was therefore
genetically an identical copy. The computer clones were designed to be
identical in capability to the models that inspired them (and, in particular,
to run the same software)” (The Oxford Dictionary of New Words,
1991:64)
In the metaphorising process from the domain of biology to the domain
of computer language the new ‘value-added’ meaning component is the
cut price of the computer clones, which in its turn makes a new shifted
meaning extension possible, as the lexeme is now also
‘widely used for other cut-price copies (for example, of cars and cameras
as well as other computers).’ (The Oxf. Dict. of New Words, 1991:64)
The criminal activity of providing mobile phones with the stolen num-
ber of a paying customer is called phone cloning, and the offending ap-
paratus is called a clone phone. To clone a phone is the action of ‘re-
chipping’ a mobile phone with another number which belongs to
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someone else. This can be done after a suitable mobile phone number
has been ‘scanned’ by some sophisticated electronic device. (Channel 4
News Bulletin 18 April 1995)
Cloning is an interesting case when considered in the semantic
triangle system. It is subject to complicated mechanisms which are the
result of the changing of the world, the rule system of language and the
understanding of both the world and language by the human mind. It
is clearly a category which can not be subjected to the rule of univocity.
Second aspect: generic posting
We are witnessing generic posting. By this we mean that the concept of
cloning as a process being applied to a wider range of objects, then be-
comes generic for this kind of process while the more specific pro-
cesses of duplicating plants, animals, etc. for the moment retain the
word but may eventually develop their own. The result is that we have
at least temporarily, a broad common concept called ‘cloning’, which
applies to all forms. Next to it we have separate more specific concepts,
with their own features, but still called ‘cloning’. These concepts have
their own partially common and partially distinct subconcepts, which
will have distinct names and some names in common. This results in
homonomy which may eventually be eliminated when techniques
develop sufficient distinctiveness as their own specialists are working
on them. The concept ‘cloning’ and its parallel ‘clone’ is then likely to
remain as a general abstraction, a superordinate term, becoming
broader and more vague as more detailed concepts spring up under this
umbrella. At the same time, for contexts where precision really matters
a different sort of generic posting occurs: amplification can be a generic
term for both cloning and PCR.
We suppose that diversification of terminology begins when groups
of specialists see the need for clearer differentiation.
Eventually scientists discover that the generic concept ‘clone’ no
longer serves a useful purpose and then rewrite history, telling us that
certain terms were originally wrongly used or wrongly understood and
that for the current state of knowledge a new terminology will make the
differences clearer. Such work may then lead to further splits, this time
between the popular name for a group of processes and the scientific
names which signify that these processes have little in common, or not
enough, at least, to be united by a superordinate concept.
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We can conclude that there is ample evidence in this story of
molecular cloning and PCR for the functionality of polysemy in the
interplay of the three elements of the semantic triangle.
3.2.2. (Near-) synonymy exists because the mechanisms for
naming can trigger several possible lexicalisations. 
Slightly different perspectives results in near-synonyms. The univocity
ideal of traditional Terminology consists of trying to eliminate some of
the near-synonyms and indicating a preferred term. The underlying idea
is that to have several terms for the same concept/category is a bad
thing as it implies an impediment for unambiguous communication.
The functional aspect of synonymy in a discourse community is over-
looked.
Starting from the example of Southern blotting we can in the first
place illustrate the functionality of synonymy and in the second place
show that the reason why synonymy is functional may be that the dif-
ferent elements which are at the basis of lexicalisation were present in
the initial situation when the technique was being developed.
The functionality of synonymy.
What is Southern blotting or Southern transfer or Southern hybridi-
sation, and second why is this synonymy functional?
“Southern blotting is the commonly used term for the technique developed
by E. M. Southern which involves the “transfer of single-stranded, re-
stricted DNA fragments (=Southern transfer), separated in an agarose gel,
to the nitrocellulose filter (or other binding matrix) which is then analyzed
by hybridization to radioactive or biotinylated single-stranded DNA or
RNA probes. The hybrids are detected by autoradiography or a color
change, respectively. S.b. reveals details of sequence organization.”
(Rieger, 1991:454-5)
In a paragraph entitled “Probes to find cloned genes” we find the
following description of Nucleic Acid Hybridization:
“Nucleic Acid Hybridization. Under the appropriate conditions two com-
plementary single-stranded nucleic acids will spontaneously form base
pairs and become double-stranded. If single-stranded, nonradioactive
DNA is fixed tightly to a filter and then incubated in a solution containing
single-stranded, radioactive DNA, double-stranded regions will form
where the two types of DNA have complementary nucleotide sequences;
the radioactive DNA will become indirectly bound to the filter through its
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attachment to a specific region of nonradioactive DNA. By measuring the
amount of radioactivity bound to the filter, one can estimate the relatedness
between two DNA’s.” (Drlica,1984:68)
In Drlica, the process of what is commonly known as Southern blotting
is described but the term is not introduced, instead the hyperonym
hybridization is used.
As Grinsted and Bennett (1988:150) write: “
The general technique to determine homology is hybridization, in which
single-stranded DNA reanneals with complementary strands. Single-
stranded test DNA is annealed with labelled single-stranded ‘probe’ DNA
and the mixture then assayed for the presence of double-stranded labelled
hybrid DNA. The amount and the stability of this will be a measure of the
degree of homology between the test and the probe. In the case of frag-
ments in a gel, the aim is to hybridize each of the them to a probe. One
could hybridize each of the fragments and then hybridize them separately,
but it is simpler to do all of the hybridizations together. This is achieved by
denaturing the fragments in the gel (i.e. making them single-stranded) and
then transferring them to a filter to which they are irreversibly bound. This
is called a Southern transfer, after the inventor of the technique. (It is also
called ‘blotting’, because of the details of the technique.) The filter is then
incubated with labelled probe DNA, which hybridizes with homologous
sequences; unhybridized probe is then washed away. Therefore the only
label left on the filter should have hybridized to the test fragments. This can
be detected by autoradiography and, since the fragments on the filter re-
tain the same relative positions to each other as in the original gel, com-
parison of the position of the label on the filter and the photograph of the
gel shows which fragments have homology with the probe.”
Figure 14: the motivation for the synonymous naming of Southern’s technique.
The naming of Southern’s technique is motivated by (at least) three
aspects of the (encyclopaedic) information concerning the technique.
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motivation
Southern blotting the result of the technique is a blot on a filter
Southern transfer the process of transferring the denatured (single 
stranded) fragments from a gel to a filter
Southern hybridisation the principle of the technique: single stranded 
DNA reanneals with complementary strands
Depending on which of the three elements a language user wants to
stress in a particular context the use of one or another of the synonyms
can be appropriate for more nuanced communication.
The reason why synonymy is functional shows in the presence of
the elements for alternative motivated names in the original texts
on the method.
E.M. Southern described his technique in two articles: “Detection of
Specific Sequences Among DNA Fragments Separated by Gel Electro-
phoresis.” (1975) and ‘Gel Electrophoresis.’ (1979).
Southern does not refer to his own technique with ‘Southern blot-
ting’. Modesty or ‘good manners’ must be the explanation. In the 1979-
volume of Methods in Enzymology, in which Southern publishes his
second well-known article, he does not use the term Southern blotting
for his own method whereas other authors in the same volume con-
sistently do. e.g.:
Szostak, J. et al. “ Hybridization with Synthetic Oligonucleotides”:
“In this chapter we describe procedures for the use of synthetic oligonu-
cleotides for Southern blot experiments and gene bank screening, and
demonstrate the effect of various mismatches on the efficiency of hybrid-
ization.” (420)
“DNA fragments were transferred to nitrocellulose paper (Schleicher and
Schuell) by the blotting procedure of Southern (...).” (421)
To refer to one’s own method is felt by Southern as ‘something which
cannot be done’, apparently. His modesty also shows from the para-
graph entitled “Detection of Specific Sequences.” (157) in which he
gives a survey of the methods available to identify a particular sequence
in DNA fragments separated by gel electrophoresis; and mentions his
own method in the last place, even though his method (the Southern
blotting technique) chronologically was the first one developed in time
(1975) (protein: 1976; RNA: 1977).
However, his summary description of his own method is very accu-
rate and contains the three elements which served in naming the tech-
nique: transfer, blotting and hybridization.(157-58)
“(...) DNA may be transferred from the gel to a sheet of cellulose nitrate,
retaining the original patterns. The sheet of cellulose nitrate is laid against
the gel, and solvent blotted through it by stacking absorbent paper on top.
DNA is carried out of the gel by the flow of solvent and trapped in the cel-
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lulose nitrate paper, which is subsequently used for hybridization using
well-established methods.”
So all the elements for naming Southern’s technique Southern blotting,
Southern transfer or Southern hybridization were present in his own de-
scription of the technique. 
3.2.3. The third aspect of the univocity ideal for terminology
which wants to rule out figurative language and replace it by
literal equivalents is untenable as figurative language has a
function in the development of LSP.
The objectivist structuralist credo of traditional Terminology offered no
tools for dealing with metaphor and metonymy, which were treated as
unwanted and belonging to the figurative language which had to be
replaced by literal equivalents. Figurative language was avoided as it
was an impediment for scientific i.e. logical thinking. Experientialism
ventures to study the influence of especially metaphorical models on
categorisation and understanding.
In contrast with objectivism in which reality and the understanding
thereof is seen as objective, independent of language and disembodied,
cognitive semantics sees understanding and categorisation as expe-
riential, i.e. embodied and based on human interpretation.
As Johnson (1987) shows experientialism opens up perspectives for
imagination and creative thinking in which language as a medium for
cognition and for communication about this cognition has a position.
Imaginative and creative thinking is often reflected in the use of meta-
phors.
Metaphor is not in the first place studied as a language phenomenon,
“a deviant form of expression or a nonessential figure of speech”
(Johnson, 1987:66), but as a fundamental process at the cognitive level,
the non-propositional level at which metaphorical projections can be
experientially creative. This non-propositional level we have referred to
elsewhere as the metaphorical environment (Temmerman, 1995)
Metaphorical thinking in the life sciences shows in the metaphorical
environments which appear to exist as non-propositional gestalts in the
heads of the specialists. The tangible results of the metaphorical under-
standing of an environment are the metaphorical lexicalisations for
many (new) categories in the discipline.
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Johnson and Lakoff (1980) in Metaphors we live by, and Lakoff
(1987) in Women, Fire, and Dangereous Things, showed how metaphor
is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and
action. Their thesis is that metaphor in language is possible because
there are metaphors in the human conceptual system as “most of our
normal conceptual system is metaphorically structured”. 
Metaphors are culturally grounded in our physical and cultural expe-
rience. Experiential ‘gestalts’ are multidimensional structured wholes
which are the basic dimensions of our experience. We classify partic-
ular experiences in terms of experiential gestalts (Lakoff & Johnson,
1980:82). Understanding takes place in terms of entire domains of
experience and not in terms of isolated concepts.
A theory of human conceptual systems has to account for how con-
cepts are a) grounded, b) structured, c) related) and d) defined (106).
Unclearly structured concepts get structured in metaphor. ‘Metaphor is
one of our most important tools for trying to comprehend partially what
cannot be comprehended totally.’ (193)
They argue that our experience is structured holistically in terms of
experiential gestalts. These gestalts have structure that is not arbitrary.
Instead, the dimensions that characterize the structure of the gestalts
emerge naturally from our experience. (224)
‘Within the experientialist myth, understanding emerges from interaction,
from constant negotiation with the environment and other people. It e-
merges in the following way: the nature of our bodies and our physical and
cultural environment imposes a structure on our experience, in terms of
natural dimensions of the sort we have discussed. Recurrent experience
leads to the formation of categories, which are experiential gestalts with
those natural dimensions. Such gestalts define coherence in our experi-
ence. We understand our experience directly when we see it as being
structured coherently in terms of gestalts that have emerged directly from
interaction with and in our environment. We understand experience meta-
phorically when we use a gestalt from one domain of experience to struc-
ture experience in another domain.’ (230)
In studying the language of the life sciences we found ample evidence
of gestalts of domains of experience which served to structure experi-
ence in the domain of the life sciences. In other words these source ge-
stalts of domains of experience provided the underlying metaphorical
environments in which progress was made in understanding and creat-
ing more and new aspects of the life sciences.
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Their is growth of understanding and knowledge through meta-
phorical reasoning. This metaphorical reasoning amounts to the under-
standing of a new fact, situation, process, or whatever type of category
based on the imagined analogy between what one is trying to come to
grips with, to understand, with something one knows and understands
already. This inventive or creative capacity is made tangible in neo-
lexicalisations. These neo-lexicalisations are functional in the process
of understanding which is reflected in language. 
To replace the denominations based on metaphor by literal language
can only be defended by a Terminology which has its roots in objec-
tivism. As soon as Terminology opens up to cognitivism it will show an
interest in the function of figurative language like metaphor in the inter-
action between the world, language and the human mind, an interaction
which aims at better understanding, i.e. progress.
The analogical reasoning of which the metaphorical naming of new
categories with existing lexemes is the result, is rooted in human
experience. 
Metaphorical environments as non-propositional gestalts give rise
to neolexicalisations.
In structuralist linguistics metaphor is treated as a type of neology at the
level of the signifié (Tournier, 1985). Traditional terminology has con-
sidered metaphor as a figure of speech which has to be avoided in un-
ambiguous scientific terminology .
The disciplines of the life sciences develop in cognitive frames or
cognitive image schemata which can be seen as gestalts. In order to
develop new ideas practitioners of the discipline of the life sciences will
also take over existing cognitive frames or cognitive image schemata
from domains of experience outside the life sciences . Whenever this
happens a metaphorical environment is brought to life.
The point is that the metaphorical environment as a gestalt plays.
This shows when we compare what is lexicalised of the metaphorical
gestalt to what can be extended but is not necessarily giving rise to
lexicalisation.
Underlying progress in the understanding of the mechanisms of life
are a number of analogies which have given rise to lexicalisation and
the development of a new lexical field based on specific metaphorical
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gestalt structures or analogy image schemata, of which the following
are examples:. 
• Genes are messages written in a language (the language meta-
phorical environment).
• The language of the genes is information which is programmed and
can be processed by the cell (the electronic information processing
metaphorical environment).
• Geneticists are explorers or discoverers of unknown territory (the
explorers metaphorical environment).13
We have been treating this more extensively elsewhere (Temmerman,
1995). For our present purpose it should suffice to show that for the ter-
minology which is a consequence of the language metaphorical envi-
ronment it is pointless if not impossible to replace the metaphorical
naming for a number of new concepts/categories by ‘literal equiva-
lents’. As the metaphor is part of the understanding of the terms in dis-
course.
In the following description we indicated all the lexicalisations
which bear on the metaphorical environment in bold.
As Shapiro describes it (1991:4), the idea that our genetic plan is
stored in letters has been around for a little more than a generation.
Before that, our ancestors were inspired by other imagined analogies
which left their traces in language.
Remnants of a much older idea are still preserved in language as a
type of verbal fossil: that heredity is preserved and transmitted by our
blood. The thought has become so familiar that we do not even pause
when we see such phrases as royal blood, bad blood, blood relative,
blue blood, and mixed blood. The blood theory was first devised by
Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) and others of that era. 
For those who believed this idea, inheritance involved a blending of
parental qualities, as in the mixture of two different liquids.
Linear text is different. It can be spliced but not blended. The child
receives a selection of components from both parents. Some remain
intact, while other traits from a parent may be lost entirely.
83
13 There are more metaphor catalysts we could concentrate on like the ‘genetic
manipulation is designing genes’ analogy or the ‘war analogy’ in the application of
genetic engineering methods in the ‘fight’ against disease. (see Liebert, 1993).
We summarize the story of inheritance and indicate the lexicalisa-
tions which bear on the underlying language analogy in bold face
(Hodson, 1992 & Berg & Singer, 1992).
The mechanisms of inheritance were discovered in 1866 by Gregor
Mendel. For Mendel the ‘factors’ of inheritance (we now call them
genes) were entirely abstract entities. Microscopes were by that time
operating at magnifications of x 1000 or more. Structures in the cell
nucleus were seen that were like coloured threads; they were named
chromosomes (from the Greek for ‘coloured bodies’). It was immedi-
ately realized that here was the reality behind Mendel’s ‘factors’.
Chromosome research became the focus of genetics. It was obvious
that the chromosomes provided the physical basis for Mendel’s mecha-
nisms of inheritance, they could not be the same as Mendel’s factors
(genes) for the simple reason that there were not enough of them.
Although the behaviour of genes was becoming better and better
understood, there was no information about their physical behaviour
beyond the fact that they were located in a row along the chromosomes.
It was clear that the genes were in some way carrying messages, and
that in order to be self-perpetuating through cell divisions, the genes
must be able to duplicate themselves accurately. But there was no
theory about what chromosomes could be made of to give them these
remarkable properties. Later experiments pointed out that the secret
was in the DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid). Francis Crick and James
Watson tackled the problem of DNA’s double helical structure by build-
ing a scale model of wire and pieces of cardboard. The molecule was
like a spiral staircase, with the steps made of pairs of bases (A (adenine)
always joined to T (thymine), C (cytosine) always joined to G (gua-
nine)) and the banisters made of sugar-phosphate chains.
What Crick and Watson had discovered was that DNA had a struc-
ture which allowed it to copy itself. Since A must be paired with T, and
C with G, it follows that, if a DNA molecule is split down the middle
lengthwise, all the information is there to reconstitute the whole mole-
cule again.
Crick and Watson’s proposed structure for DNA also provided the
explanation for how a gene works, in chemical terms. It was already
known that a gene controls the production of a single protein. What the
Crick-Watson model showed was how the gene could contain a mes-
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sage encoded in the sequence of letters which was the specification of
which protein is to be made.
The coding structure of DNA does two things:
• It ensures that DNA is replicated to produce more DNA.
• It ensures that DNA is transcribed into RNA, which is then
translated into protein.
Transcription and translation
When DNA makes a protein, it does so via an intermediate molecule
called ribonucleic acid (RNA) which is very similar to DNA. RNA is
usually in the form of a single strand. A molecule of RNA can be made
to an exact and repeatable pattern by reading off the base sequence of
a stretch of DNA; this process is called transcription. The strand of
RNA produced in this way is known as messenger RNA, or mRNA,
since it carries the message telling that protein is to be made from the
particular stretch of DNA that was copied.
Sydney Brenner worked with Crick on deciphering the DNA code,
and they discovered that it is written in ‘words’ of three letters. As
there are four possible bases occurring in groups of three there are 64
(i.e.4x4x4) possible combinations, but only 20 amino acids to be coded
for. It turned out that most amino acids are coded for by more than one
codon, and that there are three codons which do not represent any ami-
no acid but are ‘stop’ signals where the protein-coding message ends.
The code sequence of the DNA gene is used to build a molecule of
messenger RNA; this is assembled by an enzyme called RNA poly-
merase, and this part of the process is called transcription.
There are also many molecules of a different kind of RNA known as
transfer RNA (tRNA). Each tRNA molecule consists of only three
bases. These three bases form an anticodon, and each of these matches
on to the codon in the mRNA. This part of the process, known as trans-
lation, takes place on the ribosomes, which act as a sort of assembly
frame for building proteins. The tRNA molecules form a line, and the
amino acids join up in the specifies order to form the protein chain.
Once the analogy between genes and language is recognised the
image schema or cognitive frame or gestalt of language is opened up for
metaphorical transfer to the new understanding and naming of the sci-
entific field of genetics. The language metaphorical environment starts
showing its impact on thought and language. When dealing with the
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message in DNA writers rely on the existing vocabulary of everything
which has to do with language and language processing. The analogy
is also going to give rise to explicit lexicalisations:
• Genes are carrying messages.
• Genes must be able to duplicate. To duplicate is part of the image
schema of language, in its aspect of writing.
• The structure of DNA allowed it to copy itself which results in a
lexicalisation: ‘DNA copying’.
• The message in the gene is determined by the sequence of letters.
This results in the lexicalisations: to determine the sequence of the
letters is a technique called sequencing.
• DNA is transcribed into RNA, which results in the lexicalisation:
transcription.
• RNA is translated into protein, which results in the lexicalisation:
translation.
• In the process called transcription the base sequence of a stretch of
DNA is read off. The strand of RNA ... is lexicalised as messenger
RNA since it carries the message telling that protein is to be made
from the particular stretch of DNA that was to be copied.
• The DNA code is deciphered and written in words of three letters :
codons.
Two types of lexicalisations and inconsistencies.
The ‘lexicalisations’ in the domain under construction, i.e. the domain
of the structure of DNA are of two types: 
• Existing words from the metaphorical environment frame get a new
meaning, giving rise to polysemy as seen from the point of view of
the word, or to metaphorical naming or metaphorisation as seen
from the point of view of the new concept which is being named.
e.g. transcription, translation, DNA copying, message.
• The source field of the analogy is used as a source of inspiration for
creating new words which did not exist before and which were
necessary to name a new phenomenon or concept in the target field.
Codon is an example of this.
The equivalent of a codon in the image schema or cognitive frame of
‘language’ is, word, which raises the question why the new term codon
was coined?
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Apparently, word was too vague and too general and imprecise to
become a term. A codon is a word or a code consisting of 3 letters only.
In order to be more precise word would have had to be specified like in
‘three-letter word’. 
Codon sounds more scientific in analogy with lots of other scientific
words (also in the physical sciences) ending in ‘-on’: electron, trans-
poson, exon, intron, etc.., and codon is reminiscent of code (DNA code,
amino acids to be coded for, etc.) and codon is shorter.
According to Rieger (1991:98) codon goes back to Crick (1963). He
defines codon as 
“any triplet of nucleotides (coding unit) in DNA or RNA (if RNA is the car-
rier of primary genetic information as in some viruses) that codes for a
particular amino acid or signals the beginning or end of the message (anti-
codon) (...) Of the 64 possible codons in the genetic code, the mRNA trip-
lets UAA ‘ochre), UAG (amber), and UGA (opal), serve as terminator
codons, AUG and GUG are initiator codons.
Synonymous (=degenerate) codons are different codons for the same
amino acid (...). There are indications that reading of a given context may
be influenced by mRNA sequences external to this codon (effect of the
reading context on translation). Any base triplet which can encode any of
two or more amino acids is called an ambiguous codon.” (Rieger,
1991:98)14
In this fragment the metaphorical gestalt or environment is worked out
further: whatever can be ascribed to word is metaphorically transferred
to codon: a word can be synonymous, so can a codon, a word can be
ambiguous, so can a codon, there may be an effect of the reading
context on the translation of a word, the same is true for a codon.
In other sources (The New Penguin Dictionary. of Biology, 1990) the
terminator codons are named nonsense codons, a denomination which
can also be explained from the metaphorical environment, based on the
language analogy. 
This is strong evidence for the hypothesis that the metaphorical
environment is an underlying image schema which is not necessarily
fully expressed propositionally. The proof is that if one lexicalisation
(codon) is not in line with the image schema which provides the
analogy (language) this does not really disturb the analogy as the word
codon is further expanded on as if it were a synonym of word, as is
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14 The emphasis is mine.
shown in the lexicalisations synonymous and ambiguous codons
(analogy with synonymous and ambiguous words).
4. Conclusion. The consequences for terminography
We realised that it is possible to distinguish between two types of con-
cepts: those which are fit for a description in accordance with the uni-
vocity principle of traditional Terminology and those which are not.
Concepts of the first type appeared to be clear-cut and not to show
characteristics of prototype structure. For categories which do show
prototype structure the principle of univocity is impossible to apply.
The reason is that the principle is not at all in accordance with the facts
of conceptualisation, categorisation and naming in LSP. For several of
the categories we studied, the principle of univocity appeared to be use-
less as polysemy, synonymy and figurative language showed to have
their function in the coming into existence and the further development
of these categories. Therefore we propose a diversification in the
methodology of terminography. First one has to distinguish between
different types of concepts/categories In case of a clear-cut concept the
univocity principle of traditional Terminology may be applied in
terminography. in case of a category showing characteristics of proto-
type structure methods and principles have to be developed for incorpo-
rating polysemy, synonymy, and figurative language in meaning de-
scription. In order to make this possible a revaluation of what is tradi-
tionally referred to as encyclopaedic information is essential.
The impossibility to apply the univocity principle for a number of con-
cepts/categories is just one example of how the principles and methods
of traditional Terminology are an impediment for a diversified and
realistic description of categories in LSP.
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